path: root/mm/mempool.c
diff options
authorAlexander Potapenko <>2016-05-20 16:59:11 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <>2016-05-20 17:58:30 -0700
commit55834c59098d0c5a97b0f3247e55832b67facdcf (patch)
tree1fc63661f51c68e9b0aac76cb8ae6be3bea85133 /mm/mempool.c
parentb8f1a75d61d8405a753380c6fb17ba84a5603cd4 (diff)
mm: kasan: initial memory quarantine implementation
Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. When the object is freed, its state changes from KASAN_STATE_ALLOC to KASAN_STATE_QUARANTINE. The object is poisoned and put into quarantine instead of being returned to the allocator, therefore every subsequent access to that object triggers a KASAN error, and the error handler is able to say where the object has been allocated and deallocated. When it's time for the object to leave quarantine, its state becomes KASAN_STATE_FREE and it's returned to the allocator. From now on the allocator may reuse it for another allocation. Before that happens, it's still possible to detect a use-after free on that object (it retains the allocation/deallocation stacks). When the allocator reuses this object, the shadow is unpoisoned and old allocation/deallocation stacks are wiped. Therefore a use of this object, even an incorrect one, won't trigger ASan warning. Without the quarantine, it's not guaranteed that the objects aren't reused immediately, that's why the probability of catching a use-after-free is lower than with quarantine in place. Quarantine isolates freed objects in a separate queue. The objects are returned to the allocator later, which helps to detect use-after-free errors. Freed objects are first added to per-cpu quarantine queues. When a cache is destroyed or memory shrinking is requested, the objects are moved into the global quarantine queue. Whenever a kmalloc call allows memory reclaiming, the oldest objects are popped out of the global queue until the total size of objects in quarantine is less than 3/4 of the maximum quarantine size (which is a fraction of installed physical memory). As long as an object remains in the quarantine, KASAN is able to report accesses to it, so the chance of reporting a use-after-free is increased. Once the object leaves quarantine, the allocator may reuse it, in which case the object is unpoisoned and KASAN can't detect incorrect accesses to it. Right now quarantine support is only enabled in SLAB allocator. Unification of KASAN features in SLAB and SLUB will be done later. This patch is based on the "mm: kasan: quarantine" patch originally prepared by Dmitry Chernenkov. A number of improvements have been suggested by Andrey Ryabinin. [ v9] Link: Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <> Cc: Christoph Lameter <> Cc: Pekka Enberg <> Cc: David Rientjes <> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <> Cc: Steven Rostedt <> Cc: Konstantin Serebryany <> Cc: Dmitry Chernenkov <> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/mempool.c')
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/mm/mempool.c b/mm/mempool.c
index 9b7a14a791cc..9e075f829d0d 100644
--- a/mm/mempool.c
+++ b/mm/mempool.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static inline void poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element)
static void kasan_poison_element(mempool_t *pool, void *element)
if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_slab)
- kasan_slab_free(pool->pool_data, element);
+ kasan_poison_slab_free(pool->pool_data, element);
if (pool->alloc == mempool_kmalloc)
if (pool->alloc == mempool_alloc_pages)