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authorDaniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>2015-03-17 13:42:57 +0000
committerGerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>2015-03-18 09:25:13 +0100
commitf9148c8ae7b1515776699387b4d59864f302c77d (patch)
tree0c44102d8d9abb3c5e337d982b0dd7fbee3b24b5 /ui
parent0dd72e1531f0ea1a62fd016702ea3b868d116bd8 (diff)
downloadqemu-f9148c8ae7b1515776699387b4d59864f302c77d.tar.gz
ui: fix setup of VNC websockets auth scheme with TLS
The way the websockets TLS code was integrated into the VNC server made it essentially useless. The only time that the websockets TLS support could be used is if the primary VNC server had its existing TLS support disabled. ie QEMU had to be launched with: # qemu -vnc localhost:1,websockets=5902,x509=/path/to/certs Note the absence of the 'tls' flag. This is already a bug, because the docs indicate that 'x509' is ignored unless 'tls' is given. If the primary VNC server had TLS turned on via the 'tls' flag, then this prevented the websockets TLS support from being used, because it activates the VeNCrypt auth which would have resulted in TLS being run over a TLS session. Of course no websockets VNC client supported VeNCrypt so in practice, since the browser clients cannot setup a nested TLS session over the main HTTPS connection, so it would not even get past auth. This patch causes us to decide our auth scheme separately for the main VNC server vs the websockets VNC server. We take account of the fact that if TLS is enabled, then the websockets client will use https, so setting up VeNCrypt is thus redundant as it would lead to nested TLS sessions. Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'ui')
-rw-r--r--ui/vnc.c55
-rw-r--r--ui/vnc.h2
2 files changed, 52 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index 8edbb67a64..7b66f93595 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -3012,9 +3012,16 @@ static void vnc_connect(VncDisplay *vd, int csock,
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_NONE;
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
} else {
- vs->auth = vd->auth;
- vs->subauth = vd->subauth;
+ if (websocket) {
+ vs->auth = vd->ws_auth;
+ vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
+ } else {
+ vs->auth = vd->auth;
+ vs->subauth = vd->subauth;
+ }
}
+ VNC_DEBUG("Client sock=%d ws=%d auth=%d subauth=%d\n",
+ csock, websocket, vs->auth, vs->subauth);
vs->lossy_rect = g_malloc0(VNC_STAT_ROWS * sizeof (*vs->lossy_rect));
for (i = 0; i < VNC_STAT_ROWS; ++i) {
@@ -3028,7 +3035,7 @@ static void vnc_connect(VncDisplay *vd, int csock,
if (websocket) {
vs->websocket = 1;
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
- if (vd->tls.x509cert) {
+ if (vd->ws_tls) {
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->csock, NULL, vncws_tls_handshake_peek,
NULL, vs);
} else
@@ -3320,7 +3327,8 @@ vnc_display_setup_auth(VncDisplay *vs,
bool password,
bool sasl,
bool tls,
- bool x509)
+ bool x509,
+ bool websocket)
{
/*
* We have a choice of 3 authentication options
@@ -3355,10 +3363,26 @@ vnc_display_setup_auth(VncDisplay *vs,
* in an appropriate manner. In regular VNC, all the
* TLS options get mapped into VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT
* sub-auth types.
+ *
+ * In websockets, the https:// protocol already provides
+ * TLS support, so there is no need to make use of the
+ * VeNCrypt extension. Furthermore, websockets browser
+ * clients could not use VeNCrypt even if they wanted to,
+ * as they cannot control when the TLS handshake takes
+ * place. Thus there is no option but to rely on https://,
+ * meaning combinations 4->6 and 7->9 will be mapped to
+ * VNC auth schemes in the same way as combos 1->3.
+ *
+ * Regardless of fact that we have a different mapping to
+ * VNC auth mechs for plain VNC vs websockets VNC, the end
+ * result has the same security characteristics.
*/
if (password) {
if (tls) {
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
+ if (websocket) {
+ vs->ws_tls = true;
+ }
if (x509) {
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with x509 password auth\n");
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509VNC;
@@ -3371,9 +3395,17 @@ vnc_display_setup_auth(VncDisplay *vs,
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VNC;
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
}
+ if (websocket) {
+ vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_VNC;
+ } else {
+ vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
+ }
} else if (sasl) {
if (tls) {
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
+ if (websocket) {
+ vs->ws_tls = true;
+ }
if (x509) {
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with x509 SASL auth\n");
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL;
@@ -3386,9 +3418,17 @@ vnc_display_setup_auth(VncDisplay *vs,
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_SASL;
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
}
+ if (websocket) {
+ vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_SASL;
+ } else {
+ vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
+ }
} else {
if (tls) {
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
+ if (websocket) {
+ vs->ws_tls = true;
+ }
if (x509) {
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with x509 no auth\n");
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509NONE;
@@ -3401,6 +3441,11 @@ vnc_display_setup_auth(VncDisplay *vs,
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_NONE;
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
}
+ if (websocket) {
+ vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_NONE;
+ } else {
+ vs->ws_auth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
+ }
}
}
@@ -3596,7 +3641,7 @@ void vnc_display_open(const char *id, Error **errp)
}
#endif
- vnc_display_setup_auth(vs, password, sasl, tls, x509);
+ vnc_display_setup_auth(vs, password, sasl, tls, x509, websocket);
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
if ((saslErr = sasl_server_init(NULL, "qemu")) != SASL_OK) {
diff --git a/ui/vnc.h b/ui/vnc.h
index 90b25926ca..aac9156e79 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.h
+++ b/ui/vnc.h
@@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ struct VncDisplay
time_t expires;
int auth;
int subauth; /* Used by VeNCrypt */
+ int ws_auth; /* Used by websockets */
+ bool ws_tls; /* Used by websockets */
bool lossy;
bool non_adaptive;
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS