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Commit 'virtio: validate config_len on load' restricted config_len
loaded from the wire to match the config_len that the device had.
Unfortunately, there are cases where this isn't true, the one
we found it on was the wce addition in virtio-blk.
Allow mismatched config-lengths:
*) If the version on the wire is shorter then fine
*) If the version on the wire is longer, load what we have space
for and skip the rest.
(This is mst@redhat.com's rework of what I originally posted)
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2f5732e9648fcddc8759a8fd25c0b41a38352be6)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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In function do_pci_register_device() in file hw/pci/pci.c, move the assignment
of pci_dev->devfn to the position before the call to
pci_device_iommu_address_space(pci_dev) which will use the value of
pci_dev->devfn.
Fixes: 9eda7d373e9c691c070eddcbe3467b991f67f6bd
pci: Introduce helper to retrieve a PCI device's DMA address space
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Le Tan <tamlokveer@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit efc8188e9398e54567b238b756eec2cc746cd2a4)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Replace qemu_allocate_irqs(foo, bar, 1)[0]
with qemu_allocate_irq(foo, bar, 0).
This avoids leaking the dereferenced qemu_irq *.
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Crosthwaite <peter.crosthwaite@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
[PC Changes:
* Applied change to instance in sh4/sh7750.c
]
Signed-off-by: Peter Crosthwaite <peter.crosthwaite@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Batuzov <batuzovk@ispras.ru>
[AF: Fix IRQ index in sh4/sh7750.c]
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit f3c7d0389fe8a2792fd4c1cf151b885de03c8f62)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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It does a g_free() on the pointer, so don't pass a local &foo reference.
Reviewed-by: Peter Crosthwaite <peter.crosthwaite@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit 127a4e1a51c038ec9167083b65d376dddcc64530)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The device configuration is set at realize time and never changes. It
should not be migrated as it is done today. For the sake of compatibility,
let's just skip them at load time.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
[ added missing casts to uint16_t *,
added From, SoB and commit message,
Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com> ]
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e38e943a1fa20d04deb1899be19b12aadec7a585)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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TCP connectivity fails when the guest has a different endianness.
The packets are silently dropped on the host by the tap backend
when they are read from user space because the endianness of the
virtio-net header is in the wrong order. These lines may appear
in the guest console:
[ 454.709327] skbuff: bad partial csum: csum=8704/4096 len=74
[ 455.702554] skbuff: bad partial csum: csum=8704/4096 len=74
The issue that got first spotted with a ppc64le PowerKVM guest,
but it also exists for the less common case of a x86_64 guest run
by a big-endian ppc64 TCG hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
[ Ported from PowerKVM,
Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com> ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <gkurz@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 032a74a1c0fcdd5fd1c69e56126b4c857ee36611)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Due to an incomplete initialization, adding a usb-bt-dongle device through HMP
or QMP will cause a segmentation fault.
Signed-off-by: Hani Benhabiles <hani@linux.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit c340a284f382a5f40774521f41b4bade76ddfa58)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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vhost_verify_ring_mappings leaks mappings on error.
Fix this up.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8617343faae6ba7e916137c6c9e3ef22c00565d8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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This patch fixes a bug in scsi_block_new_request() that was introduced
by commit 137745c5c60f083ec982fe9e861e8c16ebca1ba8. If the host cache
is used - i.e. if BDRV_O_NOCACHE is _not_ set - the 'break' statement
needs to be executed to 'fall back' to SG_IO.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2fe5a9f73b3446690db2cae8a58473b0b4beaa32)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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We should not try to store the emw portion of the irb if extended
measurements are not applicable. In particular, we should not surprise
the guest by storing a larger irb if it did not enable extended
measurements.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit f068d320def7fd83bf0fcdca37b305f1c2ac5413)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Spotted by Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 91e7fcca4743cf694eb0c8e7a8d938cf359b5bd8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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It's a loop from i < num_sg and the array is VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE - so
it's OK if the value read is VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE.
Not a big problem in practice as people don't use
such big queues, but it's inelegant.
Reported-by: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 937251408051e0489f78e4db3c92e045b147b38b)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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KVM only supports MSIX table size up to 256 vectors,
but some assigned devices support more vectors,
at the moment attempts to assign them fail with EINVAL.
Tweak the MSIX capability exposed to guest to limit table size
to a supported value.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Acked-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 639973a4740f38789057744b550df3a175bc49ad)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Current guest kernels try allocating as many vectors as the quota is.
For example, in the case of virtio-net (which has just 3 vectors)
the guest requests 4 vectors (that is the quota in the test) and
the existing ibm,change-msi handler returns 4. But before it returns,
it calls msix_set_message() in a loop and corrupts memory behind
the end of msix_table.
This limits the number of vectors returned by ibm,change-msi to
the maximum supported by the actual device.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
[agraf: squash in bugfix from aik]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit b26696b519f853c9844e5154858e583600ee3cdc)
*s/error_report/fprintf/ to reflect v1.7.x error reporting style
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Incoming migration with stellaris_enet is unsafe.
It's being reworked, but for now, simply block it
since noone is using it anyway.
Block outgoing migration for good measure.
CVE-2013-4532
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Malformed input can have config_len in migration stream
exceed the array size allocated on destination, the
result will be heap overflow.
To fix, that config_len matches on both sides.
CVE-2014-0182
Reported-by: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
--
v2: use %ix and %zx to print config_len values
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a890a2f9137ac3cf5b607649e66a6f3a5512d8dc)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4541
s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as
size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit
this to load arbitrary data.
setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure
they are not negative.
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9f8e9895c504149d7048e9fc5eb5cbb34b16e49a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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As the macro verifies the value is positive, rename it
to make the function clearer.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3476436a44c29725efef0cabf5b3ea4e70054d57)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4542
hw/scsi/scsi-bus.c invokes load_request.
virtio_scsi_load_request does:
qemu_get_buffer(f, (unsigned char *)&req->elem, sizeof(req->elem));
this probably can make elem invalid, for example,
make in_num or out_num huge, then:
virtio_scsi_parse_req(s, vs->cmd_vqs[n], req);
will do:
if (req->elem.out_num > 1) {
qemu_sgl_init_external(req, &req->elem.out_sg[1],
&req->elem.out_addr[1],
req->elem.out_num - 1);
} else {
qemu_sgl_init_external(req, &req->elem.in_sg[1],
&req->elem.in_addr[1],
req->elem.in_num - 1);
}
and this will access out of array bounds.
Note: this adds security checks within assert calls since
SCSIBusInfo's load_request cannot fail.
For now simply disable builds with NDEBUG - there seems
to be little value in supporting these.
Cc: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3c3ce981423e0d6c18af82ee62f1850c2cda5976)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4540
Within scoop_gpio_handler_update, if prev_level has a high bit set, then
we get bit > 16 and that causes a buffer overrun.
Since prev_level comes from wire indirectly, this can
happen on invalid state load.
Similarly for gpio_level and gpio_dir.
To fix, limit to 16 bit.
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 52f91c3723932f8340fe36c8ec8b18a757c37b2b)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4539
s->precision, nextprecision, function and nextfunction
come from wire and are used
as idx into resolution[] in TSC_CUT_RESOLUTION.
Validate after load to avoid buffer overrun.
Cc: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5193be3be35f29a35bc465036cd64ad60d43385f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4538
s->cmd_len used as index in ssd0323_transfer() to store 32-bit field.
Possible this field might then be supplied by guest to overwrite a
return addr somewhere. Same for row/col fields, which are indicies into
framebuffer array.
To fix validate after load.
Additionally, validate that the row/col_start/end are within bounds;
otherwise the guest can provoke an overrun by either setting the _end
field so large that the row++ increments just walk off the end of the
array, or by setting the _start value to something bogus and then
letting the "we hit end of row" logic reset row to row_start.
For completeness, validate mode as well.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ead7a57df37d2187813a121308213f41591bd811)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4537
s->arglen is taken from wire and used as idx
in ssi_sd_transfer().
Validate it before access.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a9c380db3b8c6af19546a68145c8d1438a09c92b)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4533
s->rx_level is read from the wire and used to determine how many bytes
to subsequently read into s->rx_fifo[]. If s->rx_level exceeds the
length of s->rx_fifo[] the buffer can be overrun with arbitrary data
from the wire.
Fix this by validating rx_level against the size of s->rx_fifo.
Cc: Don Koch <dkoch@verizon.com>
Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Don Koch <dkoch@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit caa881abe0e01f9931125a0977ec33c5343e4aa7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4535
CVE-2013-4536
Both virtio-block and virtio-serial read,
VirtQueueElements are read in as buffers, and passed to
virtqueue_map_sg(), where num_sg is taken from the wire and can force
writes to indicies beyond VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE.
To fix, validate num_sg.
Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 36cf2a37132c7f01fa9adb5f95f5312b27742fd4)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4534
opp->nb_cpus is read from the wire and used to determine how many
IRQDest elements to read into opp->dst[]. If the value exceeds the
length of opp->dst[], MAX_CPU, opp->dst[] can be overrun with arbitrary
data from the wire.
Fix this by failing migration if the value read from the wire exceeds
MAX_CPU.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 73d963c0a75cb99c6aaa3f6f25e427aa0b35a02e)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-6399
vdev->queue_sel is read from the wire, and later used in the
emulation code as an index into vdev->vq[]. If the value of
vdev->queue_sel exceeds the length of vdev->vq[], currently
allocated to be VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX elements, subsequent PIO
operations such as VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_PFN can be used to overrun
the buffer with arbitrary data originating from the source.
Fix this by failing migration if the value from the wire exceeds
VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4b53c2c72cb5541cf394033b528a6fe2a86c0ac1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4530
pl022.c did not bounds check tx_fifo_head and
rx_fifo_head after loading them from file and
before they are used to dereference array.
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d8d0a0bc7e194300e53a346d25fe5724fd588387)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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4) CVE-2013-4529
hw/pci/pcie_aer.c pcie aer log can overrun the buffer if log_num is
too large
There are two issues in this file:
1. log_max from remote can be larger than on local
then buffer will overrun with data coming from state file.
2. log_num can be larger then we get data corruption
again with an overflow but not adversary controlled.
Fix both issues.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5f691ff91d323b6f97c6600405a7f9dc115a0ad1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4527 hw/timer/hpet.c buffer overrun
hpet is a VARRAY with a uint8 size but static array of 32
To fix, make sure num_timers is valid using VMSTATE_VALID hook.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3f1c49e2136fa08ab1ef3183fd55def308829584)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4526
Within hw/ide/ahci.c, VARRAY refers to ports which is also loaded. So
we use the old version of ports to read the array but then allow any
value for ports. This can cause the code to overflow.
There's no reason to migrate ports - it never changes.
So just make sure it matches.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ae2158ad6ce0845b2fae2a22aa7f19c0d7a71ce5)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4151 QEMU 1.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_load@hw/virtio/virtio.c
So we have this code since way back when:
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
array of vqs has size VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX, so
on invalid input this will write beyond end of buffer.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit cc45995294b92d95319b4782750a3580cabdbc0c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4149 QEMU 1.3.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_net_load()@hw/net/virtio-net.c
> } else if (n->mac_table.in_use) {
> uint8_t *buf = g_malloc0(n->mac_table.in_use);
We are allocating buffer of size n->mac_table.in_use
> qemu_get_buffer(f, buf, n->mac_table.in_use * ETH_ALEN);
and read to the n->mac_table.in_use size buffer n->mac_table.in_use *
ETH_ALEN bytes, corrupting memory.
If adversary controls state then memory written there is controlled
by adversary.
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 98f93ddd84800f207889491e0b5d851386b459cf)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4150 QEMU 1.5.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_net_load()@hw/net/virtio-net.c
This code is in hw/net/virtio-net.c:
if (n->max_queues > 1) {
if (n->max_queues != qemu_get_be16(f)) {
error_report("virtio-net: different max_queues ");
return -1;
}
n->curr_queues = qemu_get_be16(f);
for (i = 1; i < n->curr_queues; i++) {
n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
}
Number of vqs is max_queues, so if we get invalid input here,
for example if max_queues = 2, curr_queues = 3, we get
write beyond end of the buffer, with data that comes from
wire.
This might be used to corrupt qemu memory in hard to predict ways.
Since we have lots of function pointers around, RCE might be possible.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit eea750a5623ddac7a61982eec8f1c93481857578)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4544
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1396604722-11902-5-git-send-email-dmitry@daynix.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit f12d048a523780dbda702027d4a91b62af1a08d7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4544
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1396604722-11902-4-git-send-email-dmitry@daynix.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3c99afc779c2c78718a565ad8c5e98de7c2c7484)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4544
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1396604722-11902-3-git-send-email-dmitry@daynix.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9878d173f574df74bde0ff50b2f81009fbee81bb)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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CVE-2013-4544
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fleytman <dmitry@daynix.com>
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1396604722-11902-2-git-send-email-dmitry@daynix.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8c6c0478996e8f77374e69b6df68655b0b4ba689)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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acpi build tried to add offset of hpet table to rsdt even when hpet was
disabled. If no tables follow hpet, this could lead to a malformed
rsdt.
Fix it up.
To avoid such errors in the future, rearrange code slightly to make it
clear that acpi_add_table stores the offset of the following table - not
of the previous one.
Reported-by: TeLeMan <geleman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
(cherry picked from commit 9ac1c4c07e7e6ab16a3e2149e9b32c0d092cb3f5)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Newer firmware implement a LD_LIST_QUERY command, and due to a driver
issue no drives might be detected if this command isn't supported.
So add emulation for this command, too.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 34bb4d02e00e508fa9d111a6a31b45bbfecbdba5)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The SMART self test counter was incorrectly being reset to zero,
not 1. This had the effect that on every 21st SMART EXECUTE OFFLINE:
* We would write off the beginning of a dynamically allocated buffer
* We forgot the SMART history
Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net>
Message-id: 1397336390-24664-1-git-send-email-benoit.canet@irqsave.net
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Acked-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
[PMM: tweaked commit message as per suggestions from Markus]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 940973ae0b45c9b6817bab8e4cf4df99a9ef83d7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The PADEN bit in the transmit control register enables padding of short
data packets out to the required minimum length. However a typo here
meant we were adjusting tx_fifo_len rather than tx_frame_len, so the
padding didn't actually happen. Fix this bug.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
(cherry picked from commit 7fd5f064d1c1a827a95ffe678418b3d5b8d2f108)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The current tx_fifo code has a corner case where the guest can overrun
the fifo buffer: if automatic CRCs are disabled we allow the guest to write
the CRC word even if there isn't actually space for it in the FIFO.
The datasheet is unclear about exactly how the hardware deals with this
situation; the most plausible answer seems to be that the CRC word is
just lost.
Implement this fix by separating the "can we stuff another word in the
FIFO" logic from the "should we transmit the packet now" check. This
also moves us closer to the real hardware, which has a number of ways
it can be configured to trigger sending the packet, some of which we
don't implement.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
(cherry picked from commit 5c10495ab1546d5d12b51a97817051e9ec98d0f6)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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If VIRTIO_NET_F_CTRL_VLAN is not negotiated, do not filter out all
VLAN-tagged packets but send them to the guest.
This fixes VLANs with OpenBSD guests (and probably NetBSD, too, because
the OpenBSD driver started as a port from NetBSD).
Signed-off-by: Stefan Fritsch <sf@sfritsch.de>
Signed-off-by: Amos Kong <akong@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0b1eaa8803e680de9a05727355dfe3d306b81e17)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Current buffer size fails the assersion check in like
hw/scsi/scsi-bus.c:1655: assert(req->sense_len <= sizeof(req->sense));
when backend (block/iscsi.c) returns more data then 96.
Exercise the core dump path by booting an Gentoo ISO with scsi-generic
device backed with iscsi (built with libiscsi 1.7.0):
x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64 \
-drive file=iscsi://localhost:3260/iqn.foobar/0,if=none,id=drive-disk \
-device virtio-scsi-pci,id=scsi1,bus=pci.0,addr=0x6 \
-device scsi-generic,drive=drive-disk,bus=scsi1.0,id=iscsi-disk \
-boot d \
-cdrom gentoo.iso
qemu-system-x86_64: hw/scsi/scsi-bus.c:1655: scsi_req_complete:
Assertion `req->sense_len <= sizeof(req->sense)' failed.
According to SPC-4, section 4.5.2.1, 252 is the limit of sense data. So
increase the value to fix it.
Also remove duplicated define for the macro.
Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit c5f52875b980e54e6bebad6121c76863356e1d7f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The handler for diag 500 did not check whether the requested function
was in the supported range, so illegal values could crash QEMU in the
worst case.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
(cherry picked from commit f2c55d1735175ab37ab9f69854460087112d2756)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The transfer length depends on field BYTCHK, which is encoded in byte
1, bits 1..2. However, the guard for for case BYTCHK=11b doesn't
work, and we get case 01b instead. Fix it.
Note that since emulated scsi-hd fails the command outright, it takes
SCSI passthrough of a device that actually implements VERIFY with
BYTCHK=11b to make the bug bite.
Screwed up in commit d12ad44. Spotted by Coverity.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7ef8cf9a0861b6f67f5e57428478c31bfd811651)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The GIC_SET_LEVEL macro unfortunately overwrote the entire level
bitmask instead of just or'ing on the necessary bits, causing active
level PPIs on a core to clear PPIs on other cores.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Rob Herring <rob.herring@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1393031030-8692-1-git-send-email-christoffer.dall@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6453fa998a11e133e673c0a613b88484a8231d1d)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The ethernet device in the musicpal only has two tx queues,
but we modelled it with four CTDP registers, presumably a
cut and paste from the rx queue registers. Since the tx_queue[]
array is only 2 entries long this allowed a guest to overrun
this buffer. Remove the nonexistent registers.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1392737293-10073-1-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Acked-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
(cherry picked from commit cf143ad35018c5fc1da6365b45acda2b34aba90a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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The Exynos4210 combiner has IIC_NIRQ inputs and IIC_NGRP outputs;
use the correct constant in the loop initializing our output
sysbus IRQs so that we don't overrun the output_irq[] array.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1392659611-8439-1-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
(cherry picked from commit fce0a826083e0416981e2ea9518ce5faa75b81a3)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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