Fix typos found using codespell

* cipher/cipher-ocb.c: Fix typos.
* cipher/des.c: Likewise.
* cipher/dsa-common.c: Likewise.
* cipher/ecc.c: Likewise.
* cipher/pubkey.c: Likewise.
* cipher/rsa-common.c: Likewise.
* cipher/scrypt.c: Likewise.
* random/random-csprng.c: Likewise.
* random/random-fips.c: Likewise.
* random/rndw32.c: Likewise.
* src/cipher-proto.h: Likewise.
* src/context.c: Likewise.
* src/fips.c: Likewise.
* src/gcrypt.h.in: Likewise.
* src/global.c: Likewise.
* src/sexp.c: Likewise.
* tests/mpitests.c: Likewise.
* tests/t-lock.c: Likewise.

Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <justus@g10code.com>

3 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/random/random-csprng.c b/random/random-csprng.c
index da50fda7..dbebe98f 100644
--- a/random/random-csprng.c
+++ b/random/random-csprng.c
@@ -1234,7 +1234,7 @@ do_fast_random_poll (void)
 # endif /*!RUSAGE_SELF*/
 #endif /*HAVE_GETRUSAGE*/
 
-  /* Time and clock are availabe on all systems - so we better do it
+  /* Time and clock are available on all systems - so we better do it
      just in case one of the above functions didn't work.  */
   {
     time_t x = time(NULL);
@@ -1275,12 +1275,12 @@ _gcry_rngcsprng_fast_poll (void)
 
 
 static void
-read_random_source (enum random_origins orgin, size_t length, int level )
+read_random_source (enum random_origins origin, size_t length, int level)
 {
   if ( !slow_gather_fnc )
     log_fatal ("Slow entropy gathering module not yet initialized\n");
 
-  if ( slow_gather_fnc (add_randomness, orgin, length, level) < 0)
+  if (slow_gather_fnc (add_randomness, origin, length, level) < 0)
     log_fatal ("No way to gather entropy for the RNG\n");
 }
 
diff --git a/random/random-fips.c b/random/random-fips.c
index 0a763628..3a641b25 100644
--- a/random/random-fips.c
+++ b/random/random-fips.c
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static size_t entropy_collect_buffer_size;     /* Allocated length.  */
 /* This random context type is used to track properties of one random
    generator. Thee context are usually allocated in secure memory so
    that the seed value is well protected.  There are a couble of guard
-   fields to help detecting applications accidently overwriting parts
+   fields to help detecting applications accidentally overwriting parts
    of the memory. */
 struct rng_context
 {
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ x931_get_dt (unsigned char *buffer, size_t length, rng_context_t rng_ctx)
     if (gettimeofday (&tv, NULL))
       log_fatal ("gettimeofday() failed: %s\n", strerror (errno));
 
-    /* The microseconds part is always less than 1 millon (0x0f4240).
+    /* The microseconds part is always less than 1 million (0x0f4240).
        Thus we don't care about the MSB and in addition shift it to
        the left by 4 bits.  */
     usec = tv.tv_usec;
diff --git a/random/rndw32.c b/random/rndw32.c
index 1325b18b..1c0fc3d3 100644
--- a/random/rndw32.c
+++ b/random/rndw32.c
@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ _gcry_rndw32_gather_random_fast (void (*add)(const void*, size_t,
      However, the kernel appears to synchronise the TSCs across CPUs at
      boot time (it resets the TSC as part of its system init), so this
      shouldn't really be a problem.  Under WinCE it's completely platform-
-     dependant, if there's no hardware performance counter available, it
+     dependent, if there's no hardware performance counter available, it
      uses the 1ms system timer.
 
      Another feature of the TSC (although it doesn't really affect us here)