Applied spelling fixes and more verbose test diagnositcs by Brad Hards.

8 files changed, 20 insertions, 16 deletions

diff --git a/random/ChangeLog b/random/ChangeLog
index 2fa2b81d..71483c90 100644
--- a/random/ChangeLog
+++ b/random/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+2010-04-12  Brad Hards  <bradh@frogmouth.net>  (wk)
+
+	Spelling fixes.
+
 2010-03-24  Werner Koch  <wk@g10code.com>
 
 	* rndw32.c: Revert all changes from 2010-01-21.
diff --git a/random/random-csprng.c b/random/random-csprng.c
index 9ad39513..c0792af5 100644
--- a/random/random-csprng.c
+++ b/random/random-csprng.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int pool_balance;
 
 /* After a mixing operation this variable will be set to true and
    cleared if new entropy has been added or a remix is required for
-   otehr reasons.  */
+   other reasons.  */
 static int just_mixed;
 
 /* The name of the seed file or NULL if no seed file has been defined.
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int (*slow_gather_fnc)(void (*)(const void*, size_t,
                                        enum random_origins),
                               enum random_origins, size_t, int);
 
-/* This function is set to the actual fast entropy gathering fucntion
+/* This function is set to the actual fast entropy gathering function
    during initialization.  If it is NULL, no such function is
    available. */
 static void (*fast_gather_fnc)(void (*)(const void*, size_t,
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ _gcry_rngcsprng_dump_stats (void)
 
 
 /* This function should be called during initialization and before
-   intialization of this module to place the random pools into secure
+   initialization of this module to place the random pools into secure
    memory.  */
 void
 _gcry_rngcsprng_secure_alloc (void)
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ lock_seed_file (int fd, const char *fname, int for_write)
    correlated to some extent.  In the perfect scenario, the attacker
    can control (or at least guess) the PID and clock of the
    application, and drain the system's entropy pool to reduce the "up
-   to 16 bytes" above to 0.  Then the dependencies of the inital
+   to 16 bytes" above to 0.  Then the dependencies of the initial
    states of the pools are completely known.  */
 static int
 read_seed_file (void)
@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ do_fast_random_poll (void)
 
 /* The fast random pool function as called at some places in
    libgcrypt.  This is merely a wrapper to make sure that this module
-   is initalized and to look the pool.  Note, that this function is a
+   is initialized and to lock the pool.  Note, that this function is a
    NOP unless a random function has been used or _gcry_initialize (1)
    has been used.  We use this hack so that the internal use of this
    function in cipher_open and md_open won't start filling up the
@@ -1352,7 +1352,7 @@ _gcry_rngcsprng_create_nonce (void *buffer, size_t length)
                strerror (err));
 
   apid = getpid ();
-  /* The first time intialize our buffer. */
+  /* The first time initialize our buffer. */
   if (!nonce_buffer_initialized)
     {
       time_t atime = time (NULL);
diff --git a/random/random-fips.c b/random/random-fips.c
index 2667e71f..f9a21d08 100644
--- a/random/random-fips.c
+++ b/random/random-fips.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ struct rng_context
 
   unsigned char guard_2[1];
 
-  /* The last result from the x931_aes fucntion.  Only valid if
+  /* The last result from the x931_aes function.  Only valid if
      compare_value_valid is set.  */
   unsigned char compare_value[16];
 
@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ _gcry_rngfips_selftest (selftest_report_func_t report)
     char buffer[8];
 
     /* Do a simple test using the public interface.  This will also
-       enforce full intialization of the RNG.  We need to be fully
+       enforce full initialization of the RNG.  We need to be fully
        initialized due to the global requirement of the
        tempvalue_for_x931_aes_driver stuff. */
     gcry_randomize (buffer, sizeof buffer, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
diff --git a/random/random.c b/random/random.c
index 8df87e2d..84683378 100644
--- a/random/random.c
+++ b/random/random.c
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 
 
 /* If not NULL a progress function called from certain places and the
-   opaque value passed along.  Registred by
+   opaque value passed along.  Registered by
    _gcry_register_random_progress (). */
 static void (*progress_cb) (void *,const char*,int,int, int );
 static void *progress_cb_data;
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ _gcry_random_dump_stats (void)
 
 
 /* This function should be called during initialization and beore
-   intialization of this module to place the random pools into secure
+   initialization of this module to place the random pools into secure
    memory.  */
 void
 _gcry_secure_random_alloc (void)
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ gcry_randomize (void *buffer, size_t length, enum gcry_random_level level)
 
 
 /* This function may be used to specify the file to be used as a seed
-   file for the PRNG.  This fucntion should be called prior to the
+   file for the PRNG.  This function should be called prior to the
    initialization of the random module.  NAME may not be NULL.  */
 void
 _gcry_set_random_seed_file (const char *name)
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ _gcry_update_random_seed_file (void)
 
 /* The fast random pool function as called at some places in
    libgcrypt.  This is merely a wrapper to make sure that this module
-   is initalized and to lock the pool.  Note, that this function is a
+   is initialized and to lock the pool.  Note, that this function is a
    NOP unless a random function has been used or _gcry_initialize (1)
    has been used.  We use this hack so that the internal use of this
    function in cipher_open and md_open won't start filling up the
diff --git a/random/rndegd.c b/random/rndegd.c
index 63a5e0f1..c194225e 100644
--- a/random/rndegd.c
+++ b/random/rndegd.c
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ do_read( int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes )
 }
 
 
-/* Note that his fucntion is not thread-safe.  */
+/* Note that his function is not thread-safe.  */
 gpg_error_t
 _gcry_rndegd_set_socket_name (const char *name)
 {
diff --git a/random/rndlinux.c b/random/rndlinux.c
index 6f98a9eb..ec140a83 100644
--- a/random/rndlinux.c
+++ b/random/rndlinux.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ _gcry_rndlinux_gather_random (void (*add)(const void*, size_t,
 
   /* Enter the read loop.  */
   delay = 0;  /* Start with 0 seconds so that we do no block on the
-                 first iteration and in turn call the progess function
+                 first iteration and in turn call the progress function
                  before blocking.  To give the OS a better chance to
                  return with something we will actually use 100ms. */
   while (length)
diff --git a/random/rndunix.c b/random/rndunix.c
index 9c9317d5..2db718da 100644
--- a/random/rndunix.c
+++ b/random/rndunix.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@
  * '1024 / SC_0' */
 
 #define SC( weight )	( 1024 / weight )	/* Scale factor */
-#define SC_0			16384	/* SC( SC_0 ) evalutes to 0 */
+#define SC_0			16384	/* SC( SC_0 ) evaluates to 0 */
 
 static struct RI {
     const char *path;		/* Path to check for existence of source */
diff --git a/random/rndw32.c b/random/rndw32.c
index 49dff3cc..852f9aca 100644
--- a/random/rndw32.c
+++ b/random/rndw32.c
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ init_system_rng (void)
      the 760 MP chipset) also has a hardware RNG, but there doesn't appear 
      to be any driver support for this as there is for the Intel RNG so we 
      can't do much with it.  OTOH the Intel RNG is also effectively dead 
-     as well, mostly due to virtually nonexistant support/marketing by 
+     as well, mostly due to virtually nonexistent support/marketing by
      Intel, it's included here mostly for form's sake.  */
   if ( (!pCryptAcquireContext || !pCryptGenRandom || !pCryptReleaseContext
         || !pCryptAcquireContext (&hRNGProv, NULL, INTEL_DEF_PROV,