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What's left to do -*- outline -*-
* Next API break:
** gcry_ac_io_t
Remove use of anonymous union.
** gcry_ac
Consider to remove it.
* udiv-qrnbd.o should get build as *.lo [HPUX]
* Allow operation using RSA keys consisting of the OpenSSL keys.
This requires the introduction of a parameter names (say) U which
is calculated according to OpenSSL/PKCS#1 rules.
* Add a warning to the manual, to check that libgcrypt actually has
been compiled with thread support when used by a threaded
application.
* linker script test
Write an autoconf test to check whether the linker supports a
version script.
* Add attributes to the MPI functions.
* cipher/pubkey.c and pubkey implementaions.
Don't rely on the secure memory based wiping function but add an
extra wiping.
* update/improve documentation
** it's outdated for e.g. gcry_pk_algo_info.
** document algorithm capabilities
** Init requirements for random
The documentation says in "Controlling the library" that some
functions can only be used at initialization time, but it does not
explain what that means. Initialization is a multi-step procedure:
First the thread callbacks have to be set up (optional), then the
gcry_check_version() function must be called (mandatory), then
further functions can be used.
The manual also says that something happens when the seed file is
registered berfore the PRNG is initialized, but it does not say how
one can guarantee to call it early enough.
Suggested fix: Specify initialization time as the time after
gcry_check_version and before calling any other function except
gcry_control().
All functions which modify global state without a lock must be
documented as "can only be called during initialization time" (but
see item 1). Then the extraneous calls to _gcry_random_initialize
in gcry_control() can be removed, and the comments "not thread
safe" in various initialization-time-only functions like
_gcry_use_random_daemon become superfluous.
* Use builtin bit functions of gcc 3.4
* Consider using a daemon to maintain the random pool
[Partly done] The down side of this is that we can't assume that the
random has has always been stored in "secure memory". And we rely
on that sniffing of Unix domain sockets is not possible. We can
implement this simply by detecting a special prefixed random seed
name and divert in this case to the daemon. There are several
benefits with such an approach: We keep the state of the RNG over
invocations of libgcrypt based applications, don't need time
consuming initialization of the pool and in case the entropy
collectros need to run that bunch of Unix utilities we don't waste
their precious results.
* Add transient flag to RSA key generation
For short living keys it makes sense to allow generation using a PRNG.
We could implement it this way:
(genkey
(rsa
(nbits 4:1024)
(transient-key)))
* Out of memory handler for secure memory should do proper logging
There is no shortage of standard memory, so logging is most likely
possible.
* mpi_print does not use secure memory
for internal variables.
* Add OAEP
* gcryptrnd.c
Requires a test for pth [done] as well as some other tests.
* secmem.c
Check whether the memory block is valid before releasing it and
print a diagnosic, like glibc does.
* threads
** We need to document fork problems
In particular that reinitialization is required in random.c
However, there is no code yet to do it.
* Tests
We need a lot more tests. Lets keep an ever growing list here.
** Write tests for the progress function
** mpitests does no real checks yet.
** pthreads
To catch simple errors like the one fixed on 2007-03-16.
** C++ tests
We have some code to allow using libgcrypt from C++, so we also
should have a test case.
* The prime generator always uses very-strong-random.
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