summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/target/i386
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorSergio Andres Gomez Del Real <sergio.g.delreal@gmail.com>2017-09-13 04:05:21 -0500
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2017-12-22 15:01:48 +0100
commitb7394c8394d38cb38b6db14eb431cac7a91e7140 (patch)
tree68ed6476103dfb40f8e214d33f2a2ad362f0434d /target/i386
parentbabfa20ca4721e950d8096f32b1dc091763a8837 (diff)
downloadqemu-b7394c8394d38cb38b6db14eb431cac7a91e7140.tar.gz
i386: hvf: refactor event injection code for hvf
This patch refactors the event-injection code for hvf by using the appropriate fields already provided by CPUX86State. At vmexit, it fills these fields so that hvf_inject_interrupts can just retrieve them without calling into hvf. Signed-off-by: Sergio Andres Gomez Del Real <Sergio.G.DelReal@gmail.com> Message-Id: <20170913090522.4022-14-Sergio.G.DelReal@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'target/i386')
-rw-r--r--target/i386/cpu.c3
-rw-r--r--target/i386/hvf-all.c61
-rw-r--r--target/i386/hvf-utils/vmcs.h3
-rw-r--r--target/i386/hvf-utils/vmx.h8
-rw-r--r--target/i386/hvf-utils/x86hvf.c67
-rw-r--r--target/i386/kvm.c2
6 files changed, 102 insertions, 42 deletions
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
index fcda7609c8..3818d72831 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.c
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
@@ -3285,6 +3285,9 @@ static void x86_cpu_reset(CPUState *s)
memset(env->mtrr_var, 0, sizeof(env->mtrr_var));
memset(env->mtrr_fixed, 0, sizeof(env->mtrr_fixed));
+ env->interrupt_injected = -1;
+ env->exception_injected = -1;
+ env->nmi_injected = false;
#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY)
/* We hard-wire the BSP to the first CPU. */
apic_designate_bsp(cpu->apic_state, s->cpu_index == 0);
diff --git a/target/i386/hvf-all.c b/target/i386/hvf-all.c
index b63dd5599e..1df13fbc19 100644
--- a/target/i386/hvf-all.c
+++ b/target/i386/hvf-all.c
@@ -587,6 +587,55 @@ void hvf_disable(int shouldDisable)
hvf_disabled = shouldDisable;
}
+static void hvf_store_events(CPUState *cpu, uint32_t ins_len, uint64_t idtvec_info)
+{
+ X86CPU *x86_cpu = X86_CPU(cpu);
+ CPUX86State *env = &x86_cpu->env;
+
+ env->exception_injected = -1;
+ env->interrupt_injected = -1;
+ env->nmi_injected = false;
+ if (idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_VALID) {
+ switch (idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_TYPE) {
+ case VMCS_IDT_VEC_HWINTR:
+ case VMCS_IDT_VEC_SWINTR:
+ env->interrupt_injected = idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_VECNUM;
+ break;
+ case VMCS_IDT_VEC_NMI:
+ env->nmi_injected = true;
+ break;
+ case VMCS_IDT_VEC_HWEXCEPTION:
+ case VMCS_IDT_VEC_SWEXCEPTION:
+ env->exception_injected = idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_VECNUM;
+ break;
+ case VMCS_IDT_VEC_PRIV_SWEXCEPTION:
+ default:
+ abort();
+ }
+ if ((idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_TYPE) == VMCS_IDT_VEC_SWEXCEPTION ||
+ (idtvec_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_TYPE) == VMCS_IDT_VEC_SWINTR) {
+ env->ins_len = ins_len;
+ }
+ if (idtvec_info & VMCS_INTR_DEL_ERRCODE) {
+ env->has_error_code = true;
+ env->error_code = rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_IDT_VECTORING_ERROR);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY) &
+ VMCS_INTERRUPTIBILITY_NMI_BLOCKING)) {
+ env->hflags2 |= HF2_NMI_MASK;
+ } else {
+ env->hflags2 &= ~HF2_NMI_MASK;
+ }
+ if (rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY) &
+ (VMCS_INTERRUPTIBILITY_STI_BLOCKING |
+ VMCS_INTERRUPTIBILITY_MOVSS_BLOCKING)) {
+ env->hflags |= HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK;
+ } else {
+ env->hflags &= ~HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK;
+ }
+}
+
int hvf_vcpu_exec(CPUState *cpu)
{
X86CPU *x86_cpu = X86_CPU(cpu);
@@ -606,12 +655,9 @@ int hvf_vcpu_exec(CPUState *cpu)
cpu->vcpu_dirty = false;
}
- env->hvf_emul->interruptable =
- !(rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY) &
- (VMCS_INTERRUPTIBILITY_STI_BLOCKING |
- VMCS_INTERRUPTIBILITY_MOVSS_BLOCKING));
-
- hvf_inject_interrupts(cpu);
+ if (hvf_inject_interrupts(cpu)) {
+ return EXCP_INTERRUPT;
+ }
vmx_update_tpr(cpu);
qemu_mutex_unlock_iothread();
@@ -628,7 +674,10 @@ int hvf_vcpu_exec(CPUState *cpu)
uint64_t exit_qual = rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
uint32_t ins_len = (uint32_t)rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd,
VMCS_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LENGTH);
+
uint64_t idtvec_info = rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_IDT_VECTORING_INFO);
+
+ hvf_store_events(cpu, ins_len, idtvec_info);
rip = rreg(cpu->hvf_fd, HV_X86_RIP);
RFLAGS(env) = rreg(cpu->hvf_fd, HV_X86_RFLAGS);
env->eflags = RFLAGS(env);
diff --git a/target/i386/hvf-utils/vmcs.h b/target/i386/hvf-utils/vmcs.h
index cd3a19fe38..2a8c0424a5 100644
--- a/target/i386/hvf-utils/vmcs.h
+++ b/target/i386/hvf-utils/vmcs.h
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@
/*
* VMCS IDT-Vectoring information fields
*/
+#define VMCS_IDT_VEC_VECNUM 0xFF
#define VMCS_IDT_VEC_VALID (1U << 31)
#define VMCS_IDT_VEC_TYPE 0x700
#define VMCS_IDT_VEC_ERRCODE_VALID (1U << 11)
@@ -306,6 +307,8 @@
#define VMCS_IDT_VEC_NMI (2 << 8)
#define VMCS_IDT_VEC_HWEXCEPTION (3 << 8)
#define VMCS_IDT_VEC_SWINTR (4 << 8)
+#define VMCS_IDT_VEC_PRIV_SWEXCEPTION (5 << 8)
+#define VMCS_IDT_VEC_SWEXCEPTION (6 << 8)
/*
* VMCS Guest interruptibility field
diff --git a/target/i386/hvf-utils/vmx.h b/target/i386/hvf-utils/vmx.h
index 44a5c6d554..102075d0d4 100644
--- a/target/i386/hvf-utils/vmx.h
+++ b/target/i386/hvf-utils/vmx.h
@@ -181,6 +181,10 @@ static inline void macvm_set_rip(CPUState *cpu, uint64_t rip)
static inline void vmx_clear_nmi_blocking(CPUState *cpu)
{
+ X86CPU *x86_cpu = X86_CPU(cpu);
+ CPUX86State *env = &x86_cpu->env;
+
+ env->hflags2 &= ~HF2_NMI_MASK;
uint32_t gi = (uint32_t) rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY);
gi &= ~VMCS_INTERRUPTIBILITY_NMI_BLOCKING;
wvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY, gi);
@@ -188,6 +192,10 @@ static inline void vmx_clear_nmi_blocking(CPUState *cpu)
static inline void vmx_set_nmi_blocking(CPUState *cpu)
{
+ X86CPU *x86_cpu = X86_CPU(cpu);
+ CPUX86State *env = &x86_cpu->env;
+
+ env->hflags2 |= HF2_NMI_MASK;
uint32_t gi = (uint32_t)rvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY);
gi |= VMCS_INTERRUPTIBILITY_NMI_BLOCKING;
wvmcs(cpu->hvf_fd, VMCS_GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY, gi);
diff --git a/target/i386/hvf-utils/x86hvf.c b/target/i386/hvf-utils/x86hvf.c
index c7dbe5810f..c7a72d1890 100644
--- a/target/i386/hvf-utils/x86hvf.c
+++ b/target/i386/hvf-utils/x86hvf.c
@@ -356,50 +356,47 @@ void vmx_clear_int_window_exiting(CPUState *cpu)
bool hvf_inject_interrupts(CPUState *cpu_state)
{
- int allow_nmi = !(rvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY) &
- VMCS_INTERRUPTIBILITY_NMI_BLOCKING);
X86CPU *x86cpu = X86_CPU(cpu_state);
CPUX86State *env = &x86cpu->env;
- uint64_t idt_info = rvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_IDT_VECTORING_INFO);
+ uint8_t vector;
+ uint64_t intr_type;
+ bool have_event = true;
+ if (env->interrupt_injected != -1) {
+ vector = env->interrupt_injected;
+ intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_SWINTR;
+ } else if (env->exception_injected != -1) {
+ vector = env->exception_injected;
+ if (vector == EXCP03_INT3 || vector == EXCP04_INTO) {
+ intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_SWEXCEPTION;
+ } else {
+ intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_HWEXCEPTION;
+ }
+ } else if (env->nmi_injected) {
+ vector = NMI_VEC;
+ intr_type = VMCS_INTR_T_NMI;
+ } else {
+ have_event = false;
+ }
+
uint64_t info = 0;
-
- if (idt_info & VMCS_IDT_VEC_VALID) {
- uint8_t vector = idt_info & 0xff;
- uint64_t intr_type = idt_info & VMCS_INTR_T_MASK;
- info = idt_info;
-
+ if (have_event) {
+ info = vector | intr_type | VMCS_INTR_VALID;
uint64_t reason = rvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_EXIT_REASON);
- if (intr_type == VMCS_INTR_T_NMI && reason != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH) {
- allow_nmi = 1;
+ if (env->nmi_injected && reason != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH) {
vmx_clear_nmi_blocking(cpu_state);
}
-
- if ((allow_nmi || intr_type != VMCS_INTR_T_NMI)) {
+
+ if (!(env->hflags2 & HF2_NMI_MASK) || intr_type != VMCS_INTR_T_NMI) {
info &= ~(1 << 12); /* clear undefined bit */
if (intr_type == VMCS_INTR_T_SWINTR ||
- intr_type == VMCS_INTR_T_PRIV_SWEXCEPTION ||
intr_type == VMCS_INTR_T_SWEXCEPTION) {
- uint64_t ins_len = rvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd,
- VMCS_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LENGTH);
- wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_INST_LENGTH, ins_len);
- }
- if (vector == EXCEPTION_BP || vector == EXCEPTION_OF) {
- /*
- * VT-x requires #BP and #OF to be injected as software
- * exceptions.
- */
- info &= ~VMCS_INTR_T_MASK;
- info |= VMCS_INTR_T_SWEXCEPTION;
- uint64_t ins_len = rvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd,
- VMCS_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LENGTH);
- wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_INST_LENGTH, ins_len);
+ wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_INST_LENGTH, env->ins_len);
}
- uint64_t err = 0;
- if (idt_info & VMCS_INTR_DEL_ERRCODE) {
- err = rvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_IDT_VECTORING_ERROR);
- wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR, err);
+ if (env->has_error_code) {
+ wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR,
+ env->error_code);
}
/*printf("reinject %lx err %d\n", info, err);*/
wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, info);
@@ -407,7 +404,7 @@ bool hvf_inject_interrupts(CPUState *cpu_state)
}
if (cpu_state->interrupt_request & CPU_INTERRUPT_NMI) {
- if (allow_nmi && !(info & VMCS_INTR_VALID)) {
+ if (!(env->hflags2 & HF2_NMI_MASK) && !(info & VMCS_INTR_VALID)) {
cpu_state->interrupt_request &= ~CPU_INTERRUPT_NMI;
info = VMCS_INTR_VALID | VMCS_INTR_T_NMI | NMI_VEC;
wvmcs(cpu_state->hvf_fd, VMCS_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, info);
@@ -416,7 +413,7 @@ bool hvf_inject_interrupts(CPUState *cpu_state)
}
}
- if (env->hvf_emul->interruptable &&
+ if (!(env->hflags & HF_INHIBIT_IRQ_MASK) &&
(cpu_state->interrupt_request & CPU_INTERRUPT_HARD) &&
(EFLAGS(env) & IF_MASK) && !(info & VMCS_INTR_VALID)) {
int line = cpu_get_pic_interrupt(&x86cpu->env);
@@ -429,6 +426,8 @@ bool hvf_inject_interrupts(CPUState *cpu_state)
if (cpu_state->interrupt_request & CPU_INTERRUPT_HARD) {
vmx_set_int_window_exiting(cpu_state);
}
+ return (cpu_state->interrupt_request
+ & (CPU_INTERRUPT_INIT | CPU_INTERRUPT_TPR));
}
int hvf_process_events(CPUState *cpu_state)
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm.c
index 351b64f77c..6f69e2fcfd 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm.c
@@ -1038,8 +1038,6 @@ void kvm_arch_reset_vcpu(X86CPU *cpu)
{
CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env;
- env->exception_injected = -1;
- env->interrupt_injected = -1;
env->xcr0 = 1;
if (kvm_irqchip_in_kernel()) {
env->mp_state = cpu_is_bsp(cpu) ? KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE :