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-rw-r--r--ui/vnc.c29
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ui/vnc.c b/ui/vnc.c
index 4805ac41d0..e53e84587a 100644
--- a/ui/vnc.c
+++ b/ui/vnc.c
@@ -1521,8 +1521,37 @@ gboolean vnc_client_io(QIOChannel *ioc G_GNUC_UNUSED,
}
+/*
+ * Scale factor to apply to vs->throttle_output_offset when checking for
+ * hard limit. Worst case normal usage could be x2, if we have a complete
+ * incremental update and complete forced update in the output buffer.
+ * So x3 should be good enough, but we pick x5 to be conservative and thus
+ * (hopefully) never trigger incorrectly.
+ */
+#define VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE 5
+
void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len)
{
+ if (vs->disconnecting) {
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Protection against malicious client/guest to prevent our output
+ * buffer growing without bound if client stops reading data. This
+ * should rarely trigger, because we have earlier throttling code
+ * which stops issuing framebuffer updates and drops audio data
+ * if the throttle_output_offset value is exceeded. So we only reach
+ * this higher level if a huge number of pseudo-encodings get
+ * triggered while data can't be sent on the socket.
+ *
+ * NB throttle_output_offset can be zero during early protocol
+ * handshake, or from the job thread's VncState clone
+ */
+ if (vs->throttle_output_offset != 0 &&
+ vs->output.offset > (vs->throttle_output_offset *
+ VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE)) {
+ vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
+ return;
+ }
buffer_reserve(&vs->output, len);
if (vs->ioc != NULL && buffer_empty(&vs->output)) {